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In this paper it is argued, contrary to certain moralists, that resolutely good people can be as-
sured of a contentment of the soul. 
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INTRODUCTION
In Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle maintains that: “to fear some things is right 
and noble, and it is base not to fear them — e.g., disgrace; he who fears this is 
good and modest, and he who does not is shameless”; and that “poverty and 
disease we p e r h a p s  ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do not 
proceed from vice and are not due to a man himself ” (Aristotle, 1952a: I, 6; 
emphasis added). His point is that what is fearful — or, at least, what we should 
be m o s t  a f r a i d  o f  — is wickedness. Yet, this is avoidable. So, if we are re-
solved to be good, we do not have to live in fear of t h i s. Hence, although “the 
happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, some have the power 
of attaining, but to others, from some accident or defect of nature, the attain-
ment of them is not granted”, he claims in Politics (Aristotle, 1952b: VII, 13); 
even then “nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many 
great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and 
greatness of soul” (Aristotle, 1952a: I, 10). Therefore, despite the fact that “those 
who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes 
is happy if he is good are, whether they mean it or not, talking nonsense” (Aris-
totle, 1952a: VII, 13) for Aristotle such a person is not unhappy either, u n l e s s 
their soul is rent by faction (Aristotle, 1952a: IX, 4). Yet, it is sometimes argued 
that there are tragic situations where even good people cannot but  suffer mor-
ally. They are, then, d o o m e d  to be morally fearful, and can only hope to be 
morally l u c k y  enough not to become involved in such events. The aim of this 
paper is show that this depressing thesis is unwarranted.
CONFLICTS OF DUTY?
In reference to the hanging of Billy Budd, Peter Winch says that although Cap-
tain Vere considered it right for him to do so, he considers it to be wrong; and 
they both could be right: “I am holding that if A says «X is the right thing for 
me to do» and if B, in a situation not relevantly different, says «X is the wrong 
thing for me to do», it can be that both are correct” (Winch, 1972: 164–165). 
Raimond Gaita agrees: “there is no difference in their descriptions of the char-
acter of that innocence and of its importance to their judgements, no difference, 
that is, which explains why Vere acted one way and Winch thought it impossible 
for him to act that way” (Gaita, 1991: 110). He contends that moral deliberation 
is “irreducibly personal […] [so] this should no longer be surprising or puzzling, 
or a sign of irrationalism” (Gaita, 1991: 110). Yet, reasonable agent A who can-
not agree with reasonable agent B, will n e c e s s a r i l y  be morally fraught if he 
must actively o p p o s e  him; as he knows that he is in conflict with somebody 
whose cause is — for his adversary — a c t u a l l y  right. But, this is absurd. Moral 
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deliberation involves the weighing up harms and benefits attached to cases, and 
these are publically accessible. What needs to be decided, then, is whether or not 
upholding the rules of the sea requires the hanging. Vere is q u i t e  convinced 
that they do; so, he can be consoled in the fact that Billy is  in the wrong, despite 
his m o r a l  innocence. I f  he is correct, Winch’s finding it impossible for h i m  to 
give the execution order, is simply a matter of weakness. 
CONFLICTS OF VALUE? 
Nevertheless, Alasdair MacIntyre maintains that there can be 
rival allegiances to incompatible goods […]. It seems that there can be rival conceptions of 
the virtues, rival accounts of what a virtue is […]. Could one virtue be temporarily at least 
at war with another? […]. Can the exercise of the virtue of doing what is required of a sister 
(Antigone) […] be at odds with […] justice (Creon)? [O]ur situation is tragic in that we 
have to recognize the authority of both claims (MacIntyre, 1990: 142–143). 
His contention is that it is wrong to think “the tragic form of narrative is 
enacted when and only when we have a hero with a flaw, a flaw in practical 
intelligence which springs from inadequate possession or exercise of some vir-
tue” (MacIntyre, 1990: 163). This is because there is a multiplicity of human 
practices — such as raising a family and forging a career — which can create for 
us i r r e s o l v a b l e  moral conflicts. Hence, “there may be tensions between the 
claims of family life and those of the arts — the problem that Gauguin solved or 
failed to solve by fleeing to Polynesia” (MacIntyre, 1990: 210). The point is that 
even if he is not a bad man, w h a t e v e r  Gauguin does he is in a fix, because for 
the tragic protagonist, “ought” does n o t  imply “can” (MacIntyre, 1990: 224). 
Yet, this does not make sense. That someone should do something can only 
mean that he should do it i f  he can. But, as noted by Aquinas in his Summa 
Theologica, when discussing people wanting to enter the religious life, “husbands 
c o u l d  n o t desert their wives without i n j u s t i c e. Therefore when he [ Jesus] 
met Peter, who was married, he did not separate him from his wife, although 
he kept John from marriage when he wished to wed” (Aquinas, 2006: 2a, 2ae., 
186, 4; emphasis added). So, since “doing injustice is the g r e a t e s t  of evils”, 
states the author of Gorgias (Plato, 1960, 469b; emphasis added), if Gauguin 
s h o u l d  go to Polynesia, this can o n l y  be on the basis of f i r s t  taking care of 
his family. Consequently, e i t h e r  Polyneices body belongs to Antigone to bury; 
or it belongs to Creon to let rot; or  it belongs equally to both of them, so either 
course of action is valid.
158 Peter DRUM
BLAMELESS WRONGDOING?
However, some moralists think that there can be “acts of dirty hands — acts 
that are justified, even obligatory, but none the less w r o n g  a n d  s h a m e f u l ” 
(Stocker, 1992: 9; emphasis added). Hence, Gaita: 
in what follows, one of the ten who might be saved by the shooting of an innocent per-
son calls that shooting evil. I do not think it follows that he must say […] that therefore 
it must not or ought not be done. Do I intend his speech as an argument that the killing 
would be evil? Only in this manner and to this degree: it is meant to foreclose one way of 
talking about the killing and its relation to the ten, to the effect that though, of course, it is 
terrible it is “the right thing to do”, and so not evil. If he kills one to save ten, even because 
he believes that “he must”, that “he must” does not mean that he should not plead for the 
forgiveness, not only of the one he kills and those related to him, but of those he “saves” as 
well (Gaita, 1991: 69). 
Gaita believes that “people can do evil yet not be blameable for it […]. [But:] 
It would be wrong to infer that they are not morally responsible for what they 
did, meaning, that they should not feel remorse for what they did” (Gaita, 1991: 
43–44). If this is correct, then of course the culpability factor is unnecessary 
for a moral tragedy; but is it? Remorse is defined as “bitter repentance for [a] 
wrong committed” (Fowler & Fowler, 1974: 1050), and people a r e  blameable 
for committing wrongs. He says that: 
there are many who would say that if he [Oedipus] acted in non-culpable ignorance, then 
remorse is rationally inappropriate. But if we ask why that should be so, I know of no an-
swer which does not, in the end, beg the question about the connection between responsi-
bility and blame (Gaita, 1991: 345). 
Yet, there is no question-begging here: remorse comes from wrong-doing, 
and doing wrong accrues blame. Therefore wrong-doers are right to feel bad 
about the harm they have done, and they are right to apologise and ask for 
forgiveness, since what happened was their own fault. The point is that e i t h e r 
what is proposed i s  evil and should not be done; o r  circumstantially it i s  n o t, 
and so it can be done. For, to think that there could be a d u t y  to do the w r o n g 
thing is a contradiction in terms. 
Stocker makes the extraordinary claim that Aristotle h i m s e l f  accepts the 
morality of “dirty-hands”; because he says that “if a tyrant were to order one 
to do something base, having one’s parents and children in his power, and if 
one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death” 
(Aristotle, 1952a: III, 1), a wrong can rightfully be committed. Yet, Aristotle 
repudiates baseness. Using matricide as an example, he says that there are “some 
acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after 
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the most fearful sufferings […] for what we are forced to do is base” (Aristotle, 
1952a: III, 1). Moreover, he also says that 
not every action nor passion admits a mean; for some have names that already imply bad-
ness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder […]. 
It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them: one must always be wrong 
(Aristotle, 1952a: II, 6). 
The only time, then, that doing something a p p a r e n t l y  wrong — such as 
throwing goods overboard (Aristotle, 1952a: III, 1) — is justified, is when t h e 
b a s e n e s s  o f  t h e  a c t i o n  i s  a n n u l l e d  b y  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  t h e  c i r -
c u m s t a n c e s. For, “on condition of securing the safety of himself and his crew 
any sensible man does so” (Aristotle, 1952a: III, 1). 
CONCLUSION
Aristotle maintains that despite the vicissitudes of life, resolutely good people 
can at least be assured of p e a c e  o f  s o u l, and to this extent they are n o t  u n -
h a p p y. Hence, in reference to some very brave men who opposed the Nazis, 
Philippa Foot remarks: 
one may think that there was a sense in which […] [they] did, but also a sense in which 
they did not, sacrifice their happiness in refusing to go along with the Nazis. In the abstract 
what they so longed for — to get back to their families — was of course wholly good. But 
as they were placed it was impossible to pursue this end by just and honourable means. 
And this, I suggest, explains the sense in which they did not see as their happiness what 
they could have got by giving in. Happiness in life, they might have said, was not some-
thing possible for them” (Foot, 2001: 95). 
That this idea — that in a v i t a l  sense a good person cannot be harmed — i s 
w r o n g would be tragic. This paper has sought to reassure us that it is not.
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